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Self-Preferencing 
Michael A. Salinger* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Companies that produce at different stages of a production process or that 
produce complementary goods often have a “self-preference,” meaning that they prefer 
to buy from, sell to, or otherwise coordinate with their own internal divisions rather than 
competitors of those divisions. It is a common and self-fulfilling phenomenon. The 
expectation that other firms will engage in self-preferencing can induce firms to engage 
in the practice themselves. 
To cite just a few notable examples, in 1996, AT&T divested itself of its 
manufacturing division with the new entity being Lucent Technologies.1 While AT&T 
was itself the result of a forced vertical breakup that split AT&T’s local telephone 
operations from its long-distance service and manufacturing capabilities, the divestiture 
of Lucent Technologies was voluntary. A primary motivation was that as the markets for 
telecommunications in which AT&T competed became more competitive (due in part to 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996), its manufacturing division (known as Western 
Electric) was increasingly seeking to supply AT&T’s competitors; and those competitors 
were reluctant to rely on one of their competitors for inputs as they likely feared that 
Western Electric would give preferential treatment to its own telecommunications 
division. 
One of the major strategic moves in Google’s corporate history was to invest in the 
Android operating system and to keep it as open source software.2 Had it not done so, 
 
* Questrom School of Business, Boston University. 
1 The Story Of Ma Bell: A Brief History of the Company That Is as Old as the Telephone Itself, CNN MONEY (July 
9, 2001), https://money.cnn.com/2001/07/09/deals/att_history/.  
2 John Callaham, The History of Android OS: Its Name, Origin, and More, ANDROID AUTHORITY (Aug. 18, 2019), 
https://www.androidauthority.com/history-android-os-name-789433/; Press Release, Open Handset 
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Apple might well have come to dominate the smartphone market, making Google reliant 
on its competitor’s device for delivery of mobile search. And its decision to make Android 
open source (despite the risk that open source systems fork into incompatible variants) 
was to limit its opportunities to engage in opportunistic self-preferencing.  
In 2012, Apple replaced Google Maps for turn-by-turn instructions with Apple 
maps in iOS 6. The roll-out did not go well.3 At least initially, the move revealed a “self-
preference” despite having an inferior product, and at least part of Apple’s motive was 
likely to avoid relying on Google for an input in case Google were to threaten to give 
preferential treatment to its own use of Google Maps. 
Self-preferencing also raises public policy concerns, including antitrust doctrine 
toward vertical mergers. This latter topic has been of particular interest recently as the 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have 
just issued new vertical merger guidelines,4 36 years after the DOJ last issued merger 
guidelines that addressed vertical mergers. The DOJ 1984 Merger Guidelines5 suggested 
relatively relaxed enforcement and stood in distinct contrast to the relatively hostile 
treatment of vertical mergers in the DOJ 1968 Merger Guidelines.6 While it remains too 
early to tell whether the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines signal that the US agencies will 
be more aggressive in challenging vertical mergers than they generally have over the past 
 
Alliance, Industry Leaders Announce Open Platform for Mobile Devices (Nov. 5, 2007), 
http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/press_110507.html. 
3 Britney Fitzgerald, Apple Map Fails: 19 Ridiculous Glitches Spotted in Apple iOS 6’s Anti-Google App, 
HUFFPOST (Sept. 9, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/apple-map-fails-ios-6-maps_n_1901599. 
4 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2020) [hereinafter VERTICAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-
trade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf. 
5 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES (1984) [hereinafter 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES], 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines.  
6 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES (1968) [hereinafter 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES], 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1968-merger-guidelines. 
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three decades, they might. The DOJ’s failed challenge to AT&T’s acquisition of Time 
Warner,7 which combined AT&T’s DirecTV with Time Warner’s video networks, also 
suggests a greater willingness to block vertical mergers than they have demonstrated 
over the past 35 years. And several prominent antitrust economists have argued that 
economic analysis supports a more interventionist approach.8 
Another broad area of antitrust law in which self-preferencing plays a central role 
is allegations of “monopoly leveraging” through means other than a merger. This can 
occur in a variety of ways. Contractual tying is one. Innovation in product design is 
another, particularly in sectors in which technological change is rapid. When a company 
integrates previously separate components or products, competitors might frame the 
decision as monopoly leveraging. Yet another possibility is entry by a dominant firm into 
an adjacent or complementary stage. While entry by itself is generally considered 
procompetitive, any preferential treatment the dominant firm gives its own product is 
sometimes interpreted as monopoly leveraging.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I lay out 
the economics of self-preferencing by showing how a vertical merger between a 
distributor of two products with the manufacturer of one of those products creates an 
incentive to sell more of the good produced by the company it purchases and less of the 
competing good. I also explain the complicated ways in which that self-preference affects 
consumers. Then, I describe the new Vertical Merger Guidelines and assess their likely 
implications for enforcement. Finally, I turn to monopoly leveraging claims. I will focus 
 
7 United States v. AT&T Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
8 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1742 (2018); Steven C. Salop, 
Presentation at U.S. Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 
21st Century: Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files 
/documents/public_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_5_georgetown_slides.pdf; Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. 
Rose, Steven C. Salop, & Fiona Scott Morton, Recommendation and Comments on the Draft Vertical Merger 
Guidelines (Feb. 24, 2020), https://media.justice.gov/vod/atr/comments-draft-vmg/dvmg-0017.pdf. 
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on three cases from the tech sector: suits by the manufacturers of plug-compatible 
peripherals against IBM in the 1970’s, the Department of Justice’s suit against Microsoft 
in the 1990’s, and the investigations in a number of jurisdictions into Google for “search 
bias.” The first two are examples of product integration. The third is widely considered 
to be another such example, although I will argue that it is not. 
From the standpoint of competition policy, it might seem desirable to modularize 
competition to the greatest extent possible so that the best and cheapest products prevail 
at every stage of a production process and in every component of systems of 
complementary products. But integration can also create efficiencies – both real and 
contractual/organizational. Producers at one stage of a value chain often have the greatest 
incentive and the greatest technical capacity to lower prices or improve products at an 
adjacent stage. The challenge for public policy is how to trade off the costs of foreclosure 
resulting from self-preferencing against the efficiencies of integration. Because these 
trade-offs are complicated, it is perhaps not surprising that there have been pendulum 
swings in enforcement philosophies and expert opinions. Through the 1960’s, antitrust 
enforcement in the United States was generally hostile to vertical integration. Then, 
starting in the late 1970’s, antitrust enforcers began viewing vertical mergers and vertical 
integration as being almost entirely benign.9 In recent years, the pendulum seems to have 
at least started to swing back as several prominent scholars have argued for a much more 
aggressive stance against vertical integration and foreclosure.10 A general theme of this 
 
9 A notable exception was the decision by the Reagan administration Justice Department to settle the long-
running monopolization suit by forcing AT&T to divest itself of its local operating companies, which were 
local monopolies subject to rate regulation. But the presence (and expected persistence) of local rate 
regulation make that a special case. As long distance service was becoming increasingly competitive, there 
was a concern that AT&T would try to shift its costs for providing long distance service to its local service, 
thus both giving it a strategic advantage in long distance service and partially circumventing local rate 
regulation. Even those who view vertical integration as being benign recognize an exception for vertical 
integration to circumvent rate regulation.  
10 See note 9. 
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chapter is that despite these swings in opinion, the economics of how to weigh the 
competing effects on a case-by-case basis is still under-developed. As a result, 
presumptions play an important role in enforcement. A key question for policy makers 
is whether there should still be a presumption that the economic relationship between 
the production of vertically-related and complementary products is fundamentally 
different from the economic relationship between the production of substitute products. 
If so, intervention with respect to vertical/complementary mergers, agreements, and 
expansion should be far more limited than intervention with respect to horizontal 
mergers, agreements, and (to a lesser extent) expansion. 
I. THE ECONOMICS OF SELF-PREFERENCING 
Self-preferencing can arise for a variety of reasons. There might be technological 
advantages from physical integration of technically separable components. Technological 
coordination might require the sharing of proprietary knowledge, and a company might 
not consider contractual promises that limit another firm’s use of its intellectual property 
to provide adequate protection. When a good or service provided by a company is part 
of a system that can fail, then a company might not want to risk being blamed for a failure 
that results from another firm’s components.11 Another broad class of cases, which this 
section will address, concerns cases when competition is imperfect at adjacent stages. In 
such cases, a firm might prefer to get the margin at all stages rather than at just one.  
As noted above, it might initially seem desirable to modularize competition at 
different stages, or for different components, to the maximum extent possible.12 However, 
 
11 A classic example is Jerrold Electronics, which was a pioneer in the development of cable television 
systems at the time when the primary use of such systems was to make over-the-air television signals 
available in areas that got poor reception. Even though such systems had multiple components, some of 
which were available from multiple sources, Jerrold only offered entire systems. See United States v. Jerrold 
Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 551-52 (E.D. Pa. 1960). 
12 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Phil J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a 
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003). 
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another important consideration arises with respect to complementary activities. In the 
extreme, suppose that the two stages are provided by two different monopolists. 
Assuming they are restricted to charging linear prices,13 individual profit-maximization 
creates a problem known as “double marginalization.” A combination of the two firms 
through a merger eliminates the double marginalization and causes prices to drop. Even 
though profits go up, consumers benefit from the lower prices. In a remarkable work, 
Augustin Cournot demonstrated this point in 1838 for products that he modeled as being 
complementary.14 Spengler demonstrated it for a model of vertical mergers in 1950.15  
This trade-off between the benefits of modularizing competition for 
complementary goods and avoiding double marginalization is central to the pre-merger 
review of vertical mergers. Merger enforcement entails predicting market outcomes with 
an altered market structure. The logic competition agencies and courts use to make such 
predictions is to analyze how a merger affects the firms’ underlying incentives and to 
assume that the post-merger firm will pursue its own interest. Consider a merger of two 
competitors, A and B. When they are separate, A’s attempts to attract more business (by, 
say, cutting prices or improving its product) might take business from B. All else equal, 
therefore, a horizontal merger between A and B dulls the incentive to compete for more 
business. To the extent that there are other competitors in the market that will try to 
 
13 That is, the seller charges a constant price per unit regardless of the quantity a buyer purchases. Hart and 
Tirole analyzed vertical mergers when sellers can charge “perfect” non-linear prices. See Oliver Hart & Jean 
Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: 
MICROECONOMICS 205 (1990). With perfect non-linear prices, the price for the marginal unit equals marginal 
cost. Thus, perfect non-linear pricing eliminates EDM as an effect of a vertical merger. While non-linear 
pricing is common, “perfect” non-linear pricing is not. With perfect non-linear pricing, the seller extracts 
all the available economic profit in the fixed fee. Getting agreement on such a fixed fee, given imperfect 
information, would in general be challenging. Also, such a contract would leave the seller with no incentive 
to promote the product. To maintain such an incentive, the pricing structure must entail a price above the 
upstream firm’s marginal cost.  
14 AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 
(Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., London, MacMillan 1897). The original French version was published in 1838. 
15 Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347-52 (1950). 
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compete away business from the A-B combination and from which the combined firm 
can try to attract customers, the harm to competition may be insubstantial and potentially 
outweighed by any efficiencies that the merged firm can realize. But, absent efficiencies, 
horizontal mergers reduce the incentive of merging firms to compete.  
Because of the elimination of double marginalization (EDM) in 
vertical/complementary mergers, the effect on pricing incentives can be exactly the 
opposite of the case with horizontal mergers. This fundamental difference between the 
incentive effects of horizontal mergers and mergers of successive monopolists is why 
competition authorities and courts are generally more likely to block horizontal mergers 
than they are to block vertical or complementary mergers. As the European Commission 
explained in its non-horizontal merger guidelines: “Non-horizontal mergers are 
generally less likely to significantly impede effective competition than horizontal 
mergers.”16 It also explains why the US competition agencies have been far more likely to 
challenge horizontal mergers than vertical mergers or mergers of firms that produce 
complementary products. 
But EDM does not completely resolve the competition issues. Both Cournot’s and 
Spengler’s exposition of the problem rested on the assumption of successive or 
complementary monopoly. Those models provide no scope for self-preferencing because 
there are no competitors to be disadvantaged through a strategy of raising rivals’ costs 
(RRC) 17 or foreclosure. To model how a vertical merger could result in an anticompetitive 
effect through foreclosure of competitors of the merging firms, the underlying 
 
16 EUROPEAN COMM’N, GUIDELINES ON THE ASSESSMENT OF NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS UNDER THE COUNCIL 
REGULATION ON THE CONTROL OF CONCENTRATION BETWEEN UNDERTAKINGS, ¶11 (Oct. 18, 2008), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:265:0006:0025:en:PDF. 
17 The term “raising rivals’ costs” is due to Salop and Scheffman. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, 
Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost-Raising 
Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 19 (1987); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive 
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). 
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assumptions must allow for competition within at least one stage of production. 
A.  Effect of a Vertical Merger on Pricing Incentives 
With imperfect competition at successive or complementary stages, the theoretical 
basis for expecting self-preferencing is quite robust. However, if one then examines the 
effect of self-preferencing on consumers, the results are much more fragile. Self-
preferencing can result in consumer harm, but the case that such a result is to be expected 
is unpersuasive. 
The simplest model to explore the potential for a vertical merger to harm 
consumers entails a monopolist at one stage and two firms at the adjacent stage. For the 
purposes of this chapter, I will assume a downstream monopolist (think of it as a retailer 
and denote it as R) that (by virtue of being a monopolist) is the only seller of goods it 
purchases at wholesale from two manufacturers.18 Call the goods they produce A and B 
and refer to the two firms as MA and MB. Suppose that demand for the final goods is 
given by: 
(1) "& = 100 − 4	'& + 2''  
 
(2) "' = 100 + 2	'& − 4'', 
where "& and "' are the quantities of Goods A and B that R sells and '& and '' are the 
prices it charges. Suppose further that MA and MB have unit costs of 10 and charge R 
wholesale prices of 20. The key features of these two demand curves are that the demand 
for each good is a decreasing function of its own price and an increasing function of the 
price of the other good, so they are substitutes. When the price of one of the goods 
increases (holding constant the price of the other), some of the demand lost gets diverted 
 
18 This numerical example is based on Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers in Multi-Product Industries and 
Edgeworth’s Paradox of Taxation, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 546-56 (1991). 
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to the other good. 
It is straightforward to show that the prices that maximize the retailer’s profits in 
this example are PA = PB = 35. At those prices, demand for the two goods is QA = QB = 30. 
The retailer’s profits are given by: 
(3) C( =	 (35 − 20)30 +	(35 − 20)30 = 900	. 
The profits of the two manufacturers are: 
(4) C"& =	 (20 − 10)30 = 300	and  
 
(5) C"' =	 (20 − 10)30 = 300. 
To see that a price of 35 for Good A maximizes the retailer’s profits, consider what 
would happen if it lowered its price to 34. Based on equations (1) and (2), a reduction in 
PA by 1 causes QA to increase by 4 and QB to drop by 2. Thus, the $1 price reduction for 
Good A would result in QA = 34 and QB = 28. The retailer’s profits would then be: 
(6) C( =	 (34 − 20)34 +	(35 − 20)28 = 896	, 
which is less than the maximum profits of 900. We can decompose the profit reduction of 
4 into three components: 
(7) ∆C( = (34 − 35)30 + (34 − 20)4 − 2(35 − 20) = 	−4. 
The first term reflects the reduced price R receives for the 30 units of Good A it 
would sell at the higher price. The second term is R’s profit margin on the increased sales 
of 4 units that result from the price reduction. The last term reflects the margin R loses 
from selling 2 fewer units of Good B. 
Similarly, consider increasing PB by 1 to $36 (holding PA at the profit-maximizing 
value of 35). The increase causes the quantity of Good B demanded to drop by 4 and the 
quantity of Good A demanded to increase by 2. With those prices, R’s profits are: 
(8) C( =	 (35 − 20)32 +	(36 − 20)26 = 896. 
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Again, the profits are lower; and we can decompose the price reduction into three 
components: 
(9) 	∆C( = (36 − 35)26 − (35 − 20)4 + 2(35 − 20) = 	−4. 
The first component is the higher margin per unit that R receives on the units of 
Good B that it continues to sell. The second term is the margin R loses because of the 
reduction in demand for B caused by the price increase. The third term reflects the margin 
on the additional sales of Good A that result from the increase in the price of Good B.  
This decomposition of the incremental effects from price changes helps reveal how 
a vertical merger creates an incentive for self-preferencing. Suppose R and MA merge 
and that, as a result, R is able to obtain Good A at marginal cost of 10 rather than the 
market price of 20. Modifying equation (7) to reflect the lower marginal cost, we get: 
(7’)  ∆C( = (34 − 35)30 + (34 − 10)4 − 2(35 − 20) = 	36 
The difference between (7) and (7’) is in the middle term. Rather than getting a 
margin of (34 – 20) = 14 on each additional unit of Good A sold, R now gets a margin (34 
– 10) = 24. The extra 10 per unit that R now gets from a decrease in the price of Good A 
applied to the 4 extra units sold from the price decrease tilts the balance from making the 
price decrease unprofitable to making it profitable.  
The difference between (7) and (7’) reflects what is commonly referred to as EDM. 
Holding the price of Good B constant, the merged firm has an incentive to lower the price 
of Good A, and this incentive reflects self-preferencing. Prior to the merger, because the 
wholesale prices to R are the same for A and B (and because demands are symmetric), R 
charges the same for the two goods and is indifferent between selling an extra unit of A 
and an extra unit of B. With the merger, R’s margin on A increases and therefore it 
develops a preference for selling an additional unit of A rather than an additional unit of 
B; and, as a result, it has an incentive to lower PA (again, all else equal). 
But the effect of the merger on R’s incentives with respect to PA is not the entire 
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story. R has another lever to increase sales of A as long as it is willing to sacrifice some 
sales of B. Now that R gets Good A at a marginal cost of 10, the effect on R’s profits from 
raising PB changes from (9) to: 
(9’) ∆C( = (36 − 35)26 − (35 − 20)4 + 2(35 − 10) = 	16. 
Thus, whereas an increase in PB from 35 to 36 lowers R’s profits prior to the merger, 
the increased margin on A makes an increase in PB after the merger profitable, holding PA 
constant at $35.  
Because A and B are substitutes, every increase in sales of one of the products due 
to a decrease in its price diverts some sales from the other. Given equations (1) and (2), 
the rate of this diversion is ½ unit in lost sales of A for every 1 unit increase in the sales 
of B. The margin on the diverted sales is a marginal opportunity cost of selling each good. 
When R is independent of MA and MB, it takes this opportunity cost into account with 
respect to the retail margin. That is, when it considers lowering its price to increase sales 
of B, it recognizes that half the increased sales of B will come at the expense of sales of A. 
In the formal economic analysis, this opportunity cost has the same effect on R’s 
incentives as an out-of-pocket opportunity cost of the same magnitude. When R and MA 
merge, however, this marginal opportunity cost increases. Prior to the merger, this 
opportunity cost is the diversion ratio (0.5 in this case) multiplied by the retail margin on 
the other good. After the merger, this opportunity cost of sales of B is the diversion ratio 
multiplied by the total margin on Good A. Because the manufacturer’s margin on Good 
A had been 10 and the diversion ratio is 0.5, the merger, in effect, increases the merged 
firm’s marginal cost of selling B by 0.5 x $10 = $5. Moresi and Salop refer to this effect as 
vertical upward pricing pressure.19  
Intuitively, it might seem that a vertical merger between R and MA must entail a 
 
19 Serge Moresi and Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers, 79 
ANTITRUST L. J. 185 (2013). 
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trade-off between a price reduction for Good A due to EDM and a price increase for Good 
B from a “raising rivals’ costs” (RRC) incentive. This intuition turns out to be wrong, 
however. While the merger causes the profit-maximizing price to drop from $35 to $30, 
the price for Good B remains the same at $35. This is the case despite the vertical upward 
pricing pressure. The intuition that vertical upward pricing pressure ensures an increase 
in the price of Good B fails because it ignores how a reduction in the price of Good A 
from $35 to $30 interacts with the effect of increasing the price of B from $35 to $36. There 
are two effects to consider. In (9’), the first term reflects the increased revenue the firm 
generates from the units of Good B that it continues to sell after the $1 price increase. In 
equation (9’), the estimated effect is $26. But, the reduction in the price of Good A from 
$35 to $30 causes demand for B to drop by 10 units. Thus, the $1 increase in price 
underlying equation (9’) applies only to 16 units, not 26. Second, because the reduction 
in the price of Good A from $35 to $30 reduces the total margin on Good A, it also reduces 
the vertical upward pricing pressure. Taking account of the reduction in the price of Good 
A to $30, the effect of increasing the price of Good B to $36 becomes: 
(9’’) ∆C( = (36 − 35)16 − (35 − 20)4 + 2(30 − 10) = 	−4. 
In this specific example, because the price of Good A drops while the price of Good 
B remains the same, consumers are better off. And this is so even assuming that the 
wholesale price of Good B remains constant. If MB responds to the reduced demand for 
Good B by lowering its wholesale price, then R would rationally respond by lowering the 
retail price of Good B as well, thus making consumers still better off.20 
While the vertical merger of R and MA benefits consumers, it lowers MB’s profits. 
Without the merger, it sells 30 units of B and, with a profit margin of $10 per unit, earns 
profits of $300. After the merger, it only sells 20 and, assuming it keeps the same margin, 
 
20 Another model in which this competitive effect on the price of the intermediate good can dominate the 
foreclosure effect is Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q. J. ECON. 345-56 
(1988). 
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its profits drop to $200. Given the reduction in MB’s unit sales and profits, it should come 
as no surprise if MB complained to the competition authorities that the merger of R and 
MA will result in foreclosure of MB and will therefore be harmful to competition. But the 
profit reduction for MB resulting from the merger is due entirely to the reduction in the 
price of MA. If, as is appropriate, one interprets the retail margin on Good B as its cost of 
distribution, its loss of sales and profits does not reflect an RRC effect. 
The exposition rests on linear demand functions and a specific set of assumptions 
about the parameters (constants) in those demand curves. Actual demand curves need 
not be linear. But there is nothing unusual about linear demand curves. Moreover, some 
other commonly used functional forms lead to similar conclusions. Thus, one cannot 
dismiss the results from linear demand curves as an odd special case.21 
The condition on the parameters for a vertical merger to leave the price of Good B 
unchanged is that the coefficient on the price of Good B in the demand equation for Good 
A equals the coefficient on Good A in the demand equation for Good B. In equations (1) 
and (2), both equal 2. They do not have to be 2 for a vertical merger to have no effect on 
the price of B. That effect would be the same if both cross effects were both 0.5, 1 or 3.22 
The result does not require that the other parameters be equal, so it does not require 
symmetric demand. 
Even when the demand curves are not symmetric, there is a theoretical reason to 
 
21 Another commonly used functional form assumes that the logarithm of demand is a linear function of 
the logarithm of prices. With this functional form, the elasticities and cross-price elasticities of demand are 
constants (meaning they are the same at all prices). For a technical reason – the profit function is not 
bounded – this functional form is not suitable for analyzing profit-maximizing decisions by a firm selling 
two substitute goods. For the same reason, assuming that the logarithm of demand is a linear function of 
the prices (as opposed to the logarithm of prices), is not suitable either. However, one can assume that the 
quantity demanded is a function of the logarithm of prices. If one calibrates such a model to imply the same 
quantities demanded, elasticities of demand, and cross-price elasticities of demand as in the linear example 
in the body of this paper, it predicts that a vertical merger causes the prices of both goods to drop.  
22 As a technical matter, the magnitude of the own-price effects limits the magnitude of the cross-price price 
effects. 
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assume, as a base case, that the cross-price effects are equal.23 They do not have to be; and, 
when they are not, a vertical merger between R and MA induces a change in the price R 
charges for Good B. When the coefficient on the price of Good B in the demand equation 
for Good A exceeds the coefficient on the price of Good A in the demand for Good B, then 
the R-MA merger causes an increase in the retail price of Good B. Under that condition, 
the force driving the merged firm to increase the price of Good B – the RRC effect – 
depends on the coefficient on Good B in the demand equation for Good A. The offsetting 
effect – the effect of a reduction in the price of Good A on the optimal price for Good B – 
depends on the coefficient on the price of Good A in the demand equation for Good B. 
When the two coefficients are equal, these two effects offset each other. When the 
coefficient on the price of Good B in the demand equation for Good A exceeds the 
coefficient on the price of Good A in the demand equation for Good B, the RRC effect 
dominates. 
Even if one could present econometric evidence that the underlying demand 
conditions make an increase in the price of Good B likely, such a condition is not sufficient 
to establish net consumer harm (meaning a reduction in consumer surplus) from a 
vertical merger between R and MA. If the merger simulation implied an increase in the 
price of Good B and a decrease in the price of Good A, one would need to weigh the 
different effects. It is theoretically possible that the net effect on consumers could be 
negative. Indeed, it is theoretically possible that if the RRC effect is sufficiently strong 
and the countervailing competitive effect is sufficiently weak, the merged firm might 
have an incentive to increase the price of Good A as well as the price of Good B. 
If a merger simulation predicts that a vertical merger between R and MA would 
 
23 The theoretical foundation is known as the “Slutsky condition,” which states that the cross-price effects 
in an individual’s compensated demand curve must be equal. An individual’s actual (or “Marshallian”) 
demand curve depends on both the compensated demand curve and income effects. Income effects can 
cause the cross-price effects to differ and, in any event, market demand curves need not have this property 
of individual demand curves.  
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cause the price of Good B to increase, the same model could predict that a vertical merger 
between R and MB would cause the price of Good A to drop. This lack of robustness in 
the models that might predict harm from a vertical merger poses significant challenges 
for policy makers. If enforcement policy would prevent a firm from merging with some 
firms at an adjacent stage but not others, the agencies should be able to provide 
reasonable guidance for what determines which deals they are likely to approve and 
which ones they are likely to challenge. The DOJ sought to block AT&T’s acquisition of 
Time-Warner. Would it have sought to block AT&T from acquiring any major 
programmer? Would it have sought to block any major program distributor from 
acquiring Time-Warner? Even if the Agencies rely at least in part on the results of some 
sort of merger simulation, they need to provide enough guidance about what conditions 
tend to generate challenges that parties can rely on without hiring an economist to 
formulate and calibrate a Nash bargaining model. 
B.  Complications 
In most merger investigations, an assumption underlying the analysis of 
competitive effects is that, both before and after the merger, the firms involved choose 
the prices that maximize their profits. This is the case whether the analysis is a full-blown 
merger simulation or the relatively recent development of Upward Pricing Pressure 
(UPP) analysis.24  
To be sure, the US competition agencies have increasingly relied on bargaining 
models in their merger simulations.25 These models have proved particularly appropriate 
in markets where bargaining plays a prominent role in price determination, such as the 
 
24 Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to 
Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON.: POLICIES & PERSPECTIVES 2 (2010), https://faculty.haas. 
berkeley.edu/shapiro/alternative.pdf. 
25 Aviv Nevo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. For Econ., Antitrust Divi., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Mergers that 
Increase Bargaining Leverage (Jan. 22 2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517781/download. 
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prices that managed care companies pay hospitals.  
In analyzing bargaining situations, the standard practice among competition 
agency economists and experts who work for them is to rely on the Nash Bargaining 
solution.26 The model in the previous section rested on the assumption of duopoly 
upstream and monopoly downstream. The bargaining assumption might seem more 
natural when an upstream monopolist sells an input to two competing downstream 
firms. In such a situation, the monopolist and each downstream firm might bargain over 
the price of the intermediate good that the upstream monopolist provides. Still, one might 
imagine R and MB negotiating over the retail margin R can charge on Good B. 
Under the Nash bargaining solution, the price falls somewhere between the price 
the monopolist would ideally like to charge and the minimum it would be willing to 
accept. Where the price falls within that range depends on the relative bargaining power 
of the two firms. (If, as some modelers assume, the two parties have equal bargaining 
power, the final outcome falls near the middle of the range between the minimum price 
the seller would accept and the price that would maximize the seller’s profits.)  
In deciding the minimal terms that it is willing to accept, each firm considers what 
would happen if negotiations were to break down. When negotiations between the 
monopolist at one stage and one of two competing firms at the other stage break down, 
the result is typically increased sales by the other competing firm. When it is integrated 
with the other competing firm, the monopolist does not lose as much from the failure to 
reach an agreement because it gets the margin on the increased sales of the firm it owns. 
With less to lose from the breakdown of negotiations, it is certainly plausible that the 
merger would allow the firm to strike a more attractive bargain. Such an outcome is most 
 
26 John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 128-40 (1950). For a discussion of using the Nash 
Bargaining Model for modeling vertical mergers, see William P. Rogerson, Modelling and Predicting the 
Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers: The Bargaining Leverage Over Rivals (BLR) Effect, CANADIAN J. ECON. 
(forthcoming 2020), https://media.justice.gov/vod/atr/comments-draft-vmg/dvmg-0068.pdf. 
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plausible when the terms the monopolist negotiates before a vertical merger are worse 
than the minimum (from its perspective) acceptable terms after the merger. The case is 
less persuasive when the pre-merger terms are better from the standpoint of the 
monopolist than the minimally necessary terms for an agreement with MB to be 
profitable. 
Another complication concerns contractual incompleteness. The transactions cost 
literature on vertical integration has stressed the risk of expropriation when firms make 
“durable transaction-specific investments.”27 In the above example, if R is the only 
feasible retailer to distribute Good B to final consumers (as we have assumed), then any 
sunk costs MB had to incur to produce Good B are transaction specific. Suppose that MB’s 
entry into the market would be profitable if it could sell 30 per year with a profit margin 
of $10 per unit over the life of its investment but would be unprofitable if it could only 
sell 20 per year. Under such circumstance, B might enter if antitrust enforcement is hostile 
to vertical mergers and not enter if antitrust enforcement is tolerant of vertical mergers. 
If, in fact, one could establish that MB would not have entered had it anticipated the 
merger between R and MA, is there a persuasive case that the merger is anticompetitive 
and should be blocked? 
Such a position is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it ignores the 
possibility that R would acquire MB and that such an acquisition would increase the 
expected profitability of MB’s entry. Second, and more fundamentally, suppose that the 
profitability of MB’s entry also requires the persistence of tacit collusion with MA to keep 
prices above their marginal costs? If so, should the antitrust authorities permit price 
fixing between MA and MB because it is “dynamically” pro-competitive? Alternatively, 
suppose that MB had entered into a contract with R under which it promised to supply 
 
27 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 
233, 239 (1979). 
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MB to R for $20/unit with the constraint that R not reduce the price of Good A below 
$35/unit? If such a contract would be viewed as a naked restraint of trade that violates 
the Sherman Act, then blocking the merger between R and MA to accomplish the 
identical objective makes no sense. 
As I will discuss in more detail below, companies often enter markets knowing 
that they rely critically on performance by companies at adjacent stages. When they do, 
they need to recognize and, to the extent possible, protect themselves against the risk that 
the company they rely on might alter its behavior.  
Whenever entry requires sunk costs, as it almost always does, it entails risks. One 
of the common risks is that the market environment becomes more competitive, thus 
making entry less attractive. Encouraging entry by standing in the way of future 
procompetitive developments is the essence of protecting competitors rather than 
protecting competition. 
II. THE NEW US VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES AND THEIR PREDECESSORS 
The first US merger guidelines that covered vertical mergers were the DOJ’s 1968 
Merger Guidelines.28 Prior to the newly-issued DOJ and FTC Vertical Merger Guidelines, 
the most recent US merger Guidelines with standards for vertical mergers were the DOJ’s 
1984 Merger Guidelines.29 The DOJ and FTC have issued revised horizontal merger 
guidelines three times since 1984, most recently in 2010.30 In 2007, the European 
Commission issued non-horizontal merger guidelines.31 The US agencies, however, had 
 
28 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 6. 
29 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5. 
30 The revisions were in 1992, 1997, and 2010. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-
merger-guidelines-08192010; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (1997), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-0; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf. 
31 Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of 
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not seen fit to issue new vertical merger guidelines until now. In evaluating the new US 
vertical merger guidelines, it is worth considering what they are replacing, why it took 
so long for the FTC and DOJ to decide to issue new vertical merger guidelines, and why 
they ultimately concluded that they needed to issue new vertical merger guidelines. 
The 1968 Guidelines reflected the “structure-performance” paradigm that had 
dominated the industrial economics literature since the seminal work of Joe Bain as well 
as an implicit view that vertical mergers among firms with significant market shares 
posed nearly as great a threat to competition as horizontal mergers.32 They stated: 
The Department's enforcement activity under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as in the merger 
field generally, is intended to prevent changes in market structure that are likely to lead over 
the course of time to significant anticompetitive consequences. In general, the Department 
believes that such consequences can be expected to occur whenever a particular vertical 
acquisition, or series of acquisitions, by one or more of the firms in a supplying or purchasing 
market, tends significantly to raise barriers to entry in either market or to disadvantage 
existing non-integrated or partly integrated firms in either market in ways unrelated to 
economic efficiency.33 
The 1968 Guidelines did not explicitly use the term “self-preferencing,” but the stated 
concern about not putting other firms at a disadvantage embodies the view that self-
preferencing by a firm in a sufficiently concentrated market would constitute an antitrust 
violation. To prevent the possibility that a vertical merger would put competing firms at 
a disadvantage, the DOJ expressed its intent to block a vertical merger when the supplier 
of the intermediate good has at least 10% of the market.34 This threshold exceeded the 
market share thresholds for objectionable horizontal mergers, but not by much. 
Between 1968 and 1984, the Chicago critique of the industrial economics literature 
 
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 265 OFFICIAL J. EUR. UNION 6, 7 (Oct. 18, 2008), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52008XC1018(03); Press Release, European Comm’n, 
Mergers: Commission Adopts Guidelines for Merging Companies with Vertical or Conglomerate 
Relationship (Nov. 28, 2007), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_07_1780. 
32 See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959). 
33 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at § 11. 
34 Id. at 3 (“[A]dverse effects in the purchasing firm's market will normally occur only as the result of 
significant vertical mergers involving supplying firms with market shares in excess of 10%.”). 
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had significantly influenced antitrust policy makers.35 A key component of the Chicago 
critique was the importance of the distinction between vertical mergers and restraints on 
the one hand and horizontal mergers and restraints on the other. The two models that 
were key to the Chicago school critique of vertical merger policy were the model of a 
monopolist vertically integrating into a perfectly competitive stage and the successive 
monopoly model. The former gave rise to what is commonly referred to as the “single 
monopoly profit theorem.”36 It states that as long as an adjacent stage is competitive, a 
monopolist in one stage cannot increase its profits by vertically integrating into an 
adjacent stage. The underlying assumption of perfect competition (as well as some 
additional assumptions needed for the result) severely limit its relevance for antitrust 
policy. The key result in the successive monopoly model is that prices under successive 
monopoly are even higher than they are under vertically integrated monopoly and that, 
as a result, a vertical merger between successive monopolists would result in lower, not 
higher prices. 
These ideas influenced policy and caused the section on vertical mergers in the 
1984 Merger Guidelines to suggest much less enforcement against vertical mergers (and, 
implicitly, much less of a concern that self-preferencing is sufficient grounds for market 
intervention). The primary concern with vertical mergers expressed in those guidelines 
was potential competition. Although not explicitly stated, the underlying logic was much 
different from the logic underlying horizontal merger enforcement, which focuses 
heavily on how a merger will affect short run pricing incentives. With its focus on the 
disciplining effect of potential entry, the 1984 Guidelines would seem to suggest a merger 
of successive monopolists would face a serious risk of a challenge. Yet, according to the 
successive monopoly model, a merger of successive monopolists would create an 
 
35 While it was the Reagan era DOJ that issued the 1984 Merger Guidelines (as well as the more major 
revision in 1982), those guidelines have generally received bipartisan support. 
36 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957). 
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incentive to lower prices—not to raise them. Notwithstanding the successive monopoly 
model, however, the concern with eliminating potential competition was economically 
sound. When two firms each have dominant positions in successive (or complementary) 
stages of an industry, the dominant firm at one stage is typically the firm with the biggest 
incentive to challenge the monopoly at the adjacent stage.  
The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines seem to represent a fundamental change in 
approach. The effect of a vertical merger on entry remains a concern. Section 1 states, “In 
addition, if one of the parties to a transaction could use its pre-existing operations to 
facilitate entry into the other’s market, the Agencies may consider whether the merger 
removes competition from the potential entrant, using the methods described in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.”37 This last clause is potentially significant. The 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines state: 
A merger between an incumbent and a potential entrant can raise significant competitive 
concerns. The lessening of competition resulting from such a merger is more likely to be 
substantial, the larger is the market share of the incumbent, the greater is the competitive 
significance of the potential entrant, and the greater is the competitive threat posed by this 
potential entrant relative to others.38 
In cases of successive dominance, each firm has a (very) large share at its respective stage 
and the firm at the other stage is of great competitive significance. Thus, one can read the 
reference to the approach of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines as reflecting a particular 
concern for mergers of successively dominant firms. If the Agencies intended to indicate 
a special concern with such mergers, it is puzzling why they did so in such an indirect 
way (particularly since challenges to horizontal mergers based on potential entry 
concerns are rare).  
Despite the reference to concerns about entry, these guidelines seem to suggest 
enforcement based on predicting relatively short-run price effects (which is also the focus 
 
37 VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at § 1. 
38 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, at § 5.3. 
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of most horizontal merger enforcement). How much enforcement will change as a result 
of the new Vertical Merger Guidelines is not clear as they are ambiguous in spots. Three 
are of particular importance.  
The first issue concerns whether the projected price increases that will give rise to 
a challenge must be “downstream” (i.e., final good) or, alternatively, whether a projected 
increase in upstream prices (i.e., intermediate good prices) would be sufficient. Section 1 
states, “When a merger involves products at different levels of a supply chain, the direct 
customers the Agencies will consider are actual and potential buyers of the downstream 
products.”39 This sentence would seem to indicate that a projected increase in 
downstream prices will be necessary to warrant a challenge. However, Section 3 states, 
“In any merger enforcement action involving a vertical merger, the Agencies will 
normally identify one or more relevant markets in which the merger may substantially 
lessen competition.”40 Then, the heading for “Example 1” is “Relevant markets can be 
upstream or downstream.” If an upstream market can be a relevant market, then one 
might read this passage to suggest that increase in the price of an input (which could be 
a downstream margin) will be sufficient to merit a challenge. This distinction is important 
because, as Section II demonstrated, a plausible outcome of a vertical merger is an 
increase in the price of an input despite a reduction in the price of the final good.  
The second concerns two cryptic sentences: 
To the extent practicable, the Agencies use a consistent set of facts and assumptions to evaluate 
both the potential competitive harm from a vertical merger and the potential benefits to 
competition. 
The Agencies do not treat merger simulation evidence as conclusive in itself, and they place 
more weight on whether merger simulations using reasonable models consistently predict 
substantial price increases than on the precise prediction of any single simulation.41 
 
39 VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at § 1 (emphasis added).  
40 Id. at § 3. 
41 Id. at § 4. 
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If a “consistent set of facts” requires models based on a single set of assumptions that 
incorporates the complicated cross-effects of vertical mergers and if the second sentence 
means that the models the Agencies rely on to justify a challenge to a vertical merger 
must be robust to assumptions that are difficult to verify (such as the functional form of 
demand curves), then they may find that very few vertical mergers meet their standards 
for a challenge. However, if the Agencies mean the phrase, “[t]o the extent practicable,” 
to provide wiggle room to challenge vertical mergers even if they do not have a coherent 
model that is robust with respect to a range of plausible alternatives, then their attempts 
at enforcement might be substantially more aggressive than would be implied by those 
two sentences. 
Third, the discussion of foreclosure and raising rivals’ costs states that “a merger 
may increase the vertically integrated firm’s incentive or ability to raise its rivals’ costs by 
increasing the price or lowering the quality of the related product.”42 In general, the mere 
ability to raise prices without the incentive to do so is not taken either as evidence of 
market power or a legitimate basis for predicting price increases. For example, the 
hypothetical monopolist test that underlies market definition requires that a hypothetical 
monopolist over a product (or set of products) would find a small but significant non-
transitory price increase to be profitable.43 (Of course, a hypothetical monopolist would 
have the ability to raise prices even if doing so would cause demand to drop enough to 
make the price increase unprofitable.) 
If the Agencies are only going to challenge vertical mergers when they have a 
coherent and robust set of models based on profit-maximizing behavior that predict that 
downstream prices will increase, then these guidelines do not signal a substantial change 
in policy. However, if they are going to challenge vertical mergers because one or more 
 
42 Id. (emphasis added). 
43 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, at § 4.1. 
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firms rely on one of the merging firms for an input, do not have equally (or nearly 
equally) good alternative sources of supply, and if they are concerned that the merged 
firm will engage in self-preferencing, then the Agencies may seek to intervene in vertical 
mergers far more often than they have in the past. 
III. MONOPOLY LEVERAGING 
In the previous section, I argued that a firm with market power at one stage of 
production has the greatest incentive to enter an adjacent stage and that, as a result, a 
vertical merger between two firms with dominant positions at complementary stages can 
cause a substantial lessening of competition. But the realization of that competition 
through actual entry can also give rise to allegations of anticompetitive behavior if the 
integrating firm exhibits self-preferencing and, in so doing, creates an “unlevel playing 
field.” The problem has arisen frequently in the tech sector as highly successful firms 
have expanded into adjacent activities. In some of these cases, the integrating firm’s initial 
success was to create a “platform” that other firms used and came to rely on. The 
allegations of anticompetitive conduct often entail an implicit claim that platforms 
implicitly promise unbiased treatment to all users of the platform. A common 
complication is that the boundaries of stages and products change rapidly as technology 
advances. The economic models of leveraging posit two well-defined stages or products. 
The marketplace reality of the distinction between stages is often less clear-cut. 
A.  IBM and Manufacturers of Plug-Compatible Peripherals 
Self-preferencing is hardly a new issue in antitrust. A set of cases brought against 
IBM by the manufacturers of plug-compatible peripherals in the early 1970’s illustrates a 
common pattern.44 At the time, IBM was the largest provider of general-purpose 
 
44 California Computer Prod., Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); In re IBM 
Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Transamerica 
Computer Co. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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mainframe computers. Computer systems of that era consisted of a central processing 
unit (CPU) and a set of peripherals (tape drives, disk drives, card readers, and printers) 
that connected to the CPU. IBM sold all the components needed for a computer system. 
In addition, a set of companies reverse-engineered the interface between the peripherals 
and the CPU and offered “plug-compatible” peripherals (PCMs), typically at a lower 
price than IBM charged.  
California Computer Products (CalComp) was one of the plug-compatible 
manufacturers that sued IBM for Sherman Act violations. Its products included disk 
drives and disk drive control units. CalComp alleged that IBM’s integration of the disk 
drive control unit into some models in its System 370 line of computers, thus obviating 
the need for a separate disk drive control unit, was anticompetitive because it denied 
CalComp the opportunity to supply disk drive control units for those computers.  
In upholding the district court’s directed verdict in favor of IBM, the appeals court 
observed, “The evidence at trial was uncontroverted that integration was a cost-saving 
step, consistent with industry trends, which enabled IBM effectively to reduce prices for 
equivalent functions. Moreover, there was substantial evidence as well that in the case of 
Models 145, 158 and 168 the integration of control and memory functions also 
represented a performance improvement.”45 It went on to rule, “IBM, assuming it was a 
monopolist, had the right to redesign its products to make them more attractive to buyers 
whether by reason of lower manufacturing cost and price or improved performance. It 
was under no duty to help CalComp or other peripheral equipment manufacturers 
survive or expand. IBM need not have provided its rivals with disk products to examine 
and copy, … nor have constricted its product development so as to facilitate sales of rival 
products.”46 
 
45 California Computer, 613 F.2d at 744. 
46 Id. 
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The key aspect of this case, which is generalizable to other cases involving self-
preferencing, is that the IBM computer system created business opportunities for other 
firms; and these firms made investments that relied heavily on assumptions regarding 
IBM’s future behavior. Despite being reliant on IBM, CalComp (and other PCMs) also 
invested to compete with IBM. If the conditions underlying the single monopoly profit 
theorem held, IBM could have benefited from a competitive peripheral sector, as better 
and cheaper peripherals would increase demand for IBM systems, which IBM could 
benefit from by charging higher prices for its CPUs. In fact, another one of CalComp’s 
allegations was that IBM lowered the prices of its peripherals and raised the prices of its 
CPUs. While that pricing behavior is directionally consistent with the single monopoly 
profit theorem, it appears that IBM preferred to charge positive margins on all the 
components to its systems and that the competition from PCMs lowered its profits. Thus, 
there can be little question that IBM preferred to sell entire systems, rather than just some 
components of systems which also included equipment from PCMs.  
Should the antitrust laws protect the likes of CalComp, or is the risk that IBM 
would act so as to reduce the profitability, or even make completely obsolete, the business 
model of companies like the PCMs simply a risk that PCMs should have recognized when 
they entered? As the court ruled in Transamerica v. IBM, 
It is not difficult to imagine situations where a monopolist could utilize the design of its own 
product to maintain market control or to gain a competitive advantage. For instance, the PCMs 
were only able to offer IBM's customers an alternative because they had duplicated the 
interface…. Had IBM responded to the PCMs' inroads on its assumed monopoly by changing 
the … interfaces with such frequency that PCMs would have been unable to attach and unable 
to economically adapt their peripherals to the ever-changing interface designs, and, if those 
interface changes had no purpose and effect other than the preclusion of PCM competition, 
this Court would not hesitate to find that such conduct was predatory…. 
It is more difficult to formulate a legal standard for design conduct than it is to imagine clearly 
illegal situations. Any such standard must properly balance a concern for the preservation of 
desirable incentives with the need to prevent monopolization by technology. Like pricing, 
equipment design can have pro-competitive as well as anti-competitive aspects. Truly new 
and innovative products are to be encouraged, and are an important part of the competitive 
process. For this reason, the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power as a result of a 
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superior product does not violate the Sherman Act.47 
This statement clearly lays out the basic dilemma with respect to self-preferencing. The 
economics of why companies want to engage in self-preferencing are clear. Companies 
might, absent legal constraints, take actions for the sole purpose of excluding a 
competitor, but the challenge for public policy is to sanction anticompetitive cases 
without simultaneously chilling the incentive to continue to innovate.48 
B.  Microsoft 
Microsoft’s first product was the operating system DOS. It attained a dominant 
position as the operating system for personal computers when IBM selected it as the 
operating system for its personal computers. In 1983, Apple introduced the Lisa line of 
computers, which were the first personal computers with a graphical user interface 
(GUI). Microsoft responded by introducing Windows. The first versions of Windows 
were desktop programs that sat on top of DOS. With its Windows 95 release, Microsoft 
integrated the desktop program into the operating system.  
Windows (and, before it, DOS) is an open operating system. It exposes 
“Applications Programming Interfaces” (APIs) that writers of computer applications use 
as hooks to make their programs run. Windows is a platform that is a classic example of 
a two-sided product.49 It needs to attract users, but users do buy Windows-based 
computers to use Windows applications, not just Windows itself. Microsoft needs 
 
47 Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1003. 
48 The Transamerica court’s ruling leaves open the issue of the burden of proof. Should IBM have to prove 
that its design changes were superior, or should there be a strong presumption that innovation in product 
design is pro-competitive and only in violation of competition statutes when there is evidence that the sole 
objective of the design change was to exclude competition?  
49 Another term for two-sided products is two-sided platforms or, more generally, multi-sided platforms. 
For more on multi-sided platforms, see John M. Yun, Overview of Network Effects & Platforms in Digital 
Markets, in THE GAI REPORT ON THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2020). 
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applications programmers to write programs for Windows, which is why Microsoft has 
Microsoft developer tools. 
Precisely because Microsoft could expect to sell more copies of Windows if better 
Windows applications were available, it had an incentive to write applications itself. This 
need was particularly urgent when Lotus 1-2-3 and WordPerfect, which had been the 
most widely used spreadsheet and word processing programs for DOS, stumbled with 
their first versions for Windows. As businesses required a good set of productivity tools, 
developing a good spreadsheet and word processing program (as well as other 
components of what became the Office suite of programs) was critical to the success of 
Windows; and it did not take long for Microsoft’s personal productivity tools to dominate 
the market.  
Not only did Microsoft develop its own applications that it licensed separately 
from Windows, it continued to add features to its operating system that had previously 
been available as stand-alone products from a variety of sources. An example that might 
seem trivial is screen savers. At first, they were stand-alone applications. Microsoft’s 
inclusion of a screen saver in Windows 3.1 did not completely destroy the market for 
screen saver programs—as some people were willing to pay for designs other than those 
Microsoft offered, but the market shrunk substantially. (Of course, subsequent features 
that simply shut off monitors after a period of inactivity would have eventually destroyed 
the market.) 
If Microsoft’s inclusion of a screen saver in Windows was not controversial, its 
decision to integrate Internet Explorer (IE) into Windows 98 was. When Microsoft 
introduced Internet Explorer as a stand-alone application for Windows 95, Netscape 
dominated the market for web browsers. 
Netscape was founded in April 1994, shipped its web browser in December 1994, 
and went public in August 1995. In the quarter that proceeded its initial public offering 
(IPO), Netscape had a net loss of $1.6 billion. Despite never having turned a profit, it went 
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public at a valuation of approximately $1 billion and saw its value approximately double 
in the first day of trading (after nearly tripling in intraday trading). This IPO is credited 
as the start of the dot.com era in financial markets that culminated in the dot.com crash 
of 2000. Ultimately, Netscape lost the first round in the “browser war” to Microsoft. 
When the DOJ and several states brought an antitrust suit against Microsoft in 
1998, the centerpiece of their suit was that, at first, making Internet Explorer free and 
requiring original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to install it and, subsequently, 
integrating Internet Explorer into Windows constituted an illegal tie. The district court 
ruled that it was and that, as a result, Microsoft – at the time the company with the highest 
stock market valuation in the world – should be broken up. The US Court of Appeals for 
the DC Circuit ruled that the district court had misapplied the modified per se rule 
against tying and remanded the case to the district court to judge the tie based on a rule 
of reason.50 DOJ and Microsoft subsequently settled the case without a judgment as to 
whether the tie was reasonable.  
Whether or not Microsoft’s actions with respect to IE violated the antitrust laws 
raises fundamental issues about the antitrust treatment of self-preferencing. One view is 
that Netscape’s innovation relied heavily on a complementary asset provided by 
Microsoft and that Microsoft’s actions effectively expropriated the value of Netscape’s 
innovation. According to this view, Microsoft’s tying, if legal, would act as a disincentive 
for small firms to come up with innovative – indeed, disruptive – products. It would also 
inhibit future competition in modularized products in which all companies compete on 
a “level playing field.” 
But the dilemma that the Transamerica court so clearly articulated applies. It is easy 
to imagine how a company like Microsoft might abuse its position in the operating system 
market with respect to a successful application, but it is much harder to articulate an 
 
50 The DC Circuit did uphold the trial court on other claims. 
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economically sound standard under which its decision to integrate a new feature into its 
product is illegal. Economic models of markets with a platform and users of a platform 
assume a clear delineation between the two. Particularly in technologically advancing 
industries, however, such distinctions are rarely so clear. Before there was a web, web 
browsers were neither an application nor part of an operating system. It is not surprising 
that as the web developed, web browsers first appeared as stand-alone applications. But 
headlamps were first available only as stand-alone features for automobiles. Only after 
some time did they become a necessary component of a car. Particularly given the two-
sided nature of Microsoft’s business in which applications developers would want to 
embed calls to the web in their products, the reasonableness of Microsoft’s behavior 
should not turn merely on whether a sufficiently large fraction of personal computer 
users might have preferred to use a different browser. Yet another factor to consider is 
that Netscape’s business model entailed charging licensing fees for its browser. Had it 
prevailed in the browser wars, a double marginalization problem would have resulted.  
Whether or not Microsoft’s behavior with respect to IE was reasonable, Netscape 
and those who invested in it understood (or should have understood) the risk. As David 
Teece observed in a pathbreaking article in 1986, 
It is quite common for innovators – those firms which are first to commercialize a new product 
or process in the market – to lament the fact that competitors/imitators have profited more 
from the innovation than the firm first to commercialize it! Since it is often held that being first 
to market is a source of strategic advantage, the clear existence and persistence of this 
phenomenon may appear perplexing if not troubling. The aim of this article is to explain why 
a fast second or even a slow third might outperform the innovator. The message is particularly 
pertinent to those in science and engineering driven companies that harbor the mistaken 
illusion that developing new products which meet customer needs will ensure fabulous 
success. It may possibly do so for the product, but not for the innovator.51  
 
51 David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing 
and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y. 285, 285 (1986). 
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He went on to observe that control over key complementary assets often determines 
which company or companies profit from an innovation.  
The prospectus for Netscape’s IPO clearly articulated this risk. As it stated, “In 
particular, the Company’s client software will likely be subject to price erosion due to free 
client software distributed by online service providers, Internet access providers and 
others. In addition, computer systems companies, such as Microsoft Corporation 
(‘Microsoft’) and International Business Machines (‘IBM’), are now bundling or are 
planning to bundle client software with their operating systems at little or no additional 
cost to users, which will likely cause the price of Company’s client products to decline.”52  
As part of an extended discussion of the threat from Microsoft, the prospectus 
contains the observation, “Moreover, to complete development of Netscape Navigator 
for Windows 95, the Company must obtain certain technology from Microsoft. There can 
be no assurance that Microsoft will make such technology available to the Company on 
a timely basis, on commercially reasonable terms or at all.”53 It then goes on to explain 
that it expects similar behavior from IBM and Apple. 
Netscape entered despite this risk; and, while one can presume that Netscape and 
investors in Netscape expected general protection under the law, it seems unlikely that 
Netscape’s entry was based on the implicit assumption that antitrust law would protect 
 
52 MORGAN STANLEY & CO., NETSCAPE PROSPECTUS 7 (1995), https://archive.org/details/03Kahle001936/ 
page/n5/mode/2up?q=Risk. 
53 Id. 
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it against Microsoft’s attempts to use its dominance in personal computer operating 
systems to its advantage in competing with its browser. 
C.  Google 
No set of cases better exemplifies the challenges in formulating policy with respect 
to self-preferencing than those involving allegations of search “bias” against Google.  
One of the first of these investigations internationally was the FTC’s inquiry into 
whether Google’s search results were “biased” towards its own “properties” and, if so, 
whether such self-preferencing was an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act. After a 19-month investigation, the FTC closed the 
investigation. In its strongly-worded closing statement, the FTC went well beyond saying 
that Google’s behavior did not violate U.S. competition law. Rather, it asserted that the 
behavior at issue was the sort of competitive behavior that competition statutes 
encourage.54 Competition authorities in other jurisdictions that have reached similar 
conclusions include Taiwan,55 the UK,56 Canada,57 and Brazil.58 A notable exception to this 
list is the European Commission (EC), which issued a record fine against Google, alleging 
an abuse of dominance with respect to its shopping search.59  
 
54 U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search 
Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_statements/statement-commission-regarding-googles-search-practices/130103 
brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf. 
55 See Debra Mao & Brian Womack, Taiwan Fair Trade Agency Closes Investigations Into Google, BLOOMBERG, 
(Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-06/taiwan-fair-trade-agency-closes-
investigations-into-google. 
56 Streetmap v. Google [2016] EWHC (Ch) 253 [84]. 
57 Press Release, Competition Bureau of Canada, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding its 
Investigation into Alleged Anti-Competitive Conduct by Google, (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www. 
competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04066.html. 
58 Vinicius Marques de Crvalho, Brazil: CADE Dismisses Three Google Cases, MONDAQ (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.mondaq.com/brazil/antitrust-eu-competition-/897908/cade-dismisses-three-google-cases. 
59 Summary of Commission Decision of 27 June 2017 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 102 of the 
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At issue in the FTC investigation was Google’s use of its “universals.” To 
understand what universals are, some background on internet search is necessary. The 
internet gives people access to a trove of information; but for that access to be useful, 
people must be able to locate the information they want. Yahoo! provided one approach 
to finding information on the internet. It had hired people to review web sites and catalog 
them into categories such as “sports” or “news” and then subcategories, such as 
“basketball” and “soccer” under “sports.” As the information available on the web 
exploded, this approach proved impractical.  
Algorithmic search provided another approach. It relied on technology for 
crawling and cataloging all web sites on the “open web.” The results for a particular 
query term were then based on an algorithm that, for every query, assigned all the web 
sites the search engine had catalogued a score that reflected the match between the web 
site and the query. The results returned by early general search engines were a list of the 
sites to which the algorithm assigned the highest scores. Google’s initial success was 
because its PageRank algorithm yielded results that searchers found more useful than 
those provided by the other search algorithms available at the time.60 
Google is a general search engine, meaning that it is designed to provide responses 
for any category of search. An alternative approach to search is thematic or “vertical” 
search, meaning search engines designed for specific categories of search. This approach 
to search preceded the start of Google in 1997. Travelocity and Expedia, which were two 
of the top three specialized Web travel sites before they merged in 2015, launched in 
1996.61 MapQuest, an early Internet mapping service that AOL acquired in 2000, launched 
 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39740 – 
Google Search (Shopping)), 2018 O.J. (C 9) 5. 
60 Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 30 COMPUTER 
NETWORKS & ISDN SYS. 107 (1998). 
61 The third is Orbitz, which five of the six major airlines launched in 2001. Expedia recently merged with 
Orbitz as well. 
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in 1996. CitySearch, the first online source devoted to providing information about local 
merchants and locally available services, also launched in 1996.  
General search engines have a natural advantage over thematic search engines in 
that they provide a sort of “one-stop shopping.” But they also have an inherent 
disadvantage. A fundamental problem for search engines is to ascertain user intent. 
Search terms are inherently ambiguous, and different people entering the same search 
term might be looking for much different information. While thematic search sites have 
this problem to some extent, a query in Expedia is almost surely a travel search, and 
knowing the class of search makes it far easier to generate relevant results. 
The approach of Google and every other general search engine, including Bing, 
Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo is, for every query, to run multiple thematic algorithms. That 
is, for every query, general search engines do not run just one algorithm. They run a 
shopping algorithm, a travel algorithm, a news algorithm, a local algorithm, and so on.  
When Google first developed separate algorithms, it displayed them as different 
pages. Someone doing a shopping search on Google would have to click on the shopping 
page to see the results from Google’s shopping search, its news page to get results from 
Google’s news search, and so on. Of course, only users who understood what the separate 
pages in Google search results were would know to click on them. The different tabs 
reflecting different thematic search results gave Google what one commentator referred 
to as a “Swiss Army Knife” appearance.62  
Over time, Google and all other general search engines developed the technology 
to integrate their thematic search results onto their first “Search Engine Results Page” (or 
“SERP”) based on probabilistic assessments of the intent behind the search. A Google 
“universal” was a set of results from one of Google’s thematic searches placed together 
 
62 Danny Sullivan, Being Search Boxed to Death, CLICKZ (Mar. 28, 2001), https://www.clickz.com/being-
search-boxed-to-death/66309/. 
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in a box along with a link to more results from the same thematic search. For example, if 
Google’s algorithms determined a high probability that a search for “George Bush” (who 
was President when Google introduced universals) was likely a news-themed query, the 
SERP would contain a box with a set of links from Google’s news results along with a 
link to a page with its full set of news results for a query for “George Bush.” Similarly, if 
Google’s algorithms ascertained that a query for “Nike shoes” would, with sufficient 
probability, reflect an intent to locate a merchant that offers Nike shoes for sale, the SERP 
would have included Google’s shopping universal. 
While Google achieved great initial success by generating superior results for 
some searches, its results for other types of searches were not as strong. Google’s 
PageRank algorithm drew on the insight that the number of external links to a web page 
is a signal of page quality. As powerful as this insight was for some searches, it did not 
help much in searches for “Italian restaurants near me.” Thematic local search sites like 
Yelp! would no doubt have preferred that Google continue to respond to such queries 
with links to thematic search sites. But someone entering a query for “Italian restaurants 
near me” into Google is likely looking for a nearby Italian restaurant rather than another 
search site that will provide a list of nearby Italian restaurants. In this regard, Google’s 
universal search results were simply its search results for queries that it perceived with 
some probability to fit a particular theme, and allegations that Google search results were 
biased toward Google “properties” were, in effect, allegations that Google search results 
were biased toward Google search results. The implicit assertion that the thematic results 
were somehow distinct from Google’s “general” search results reflects a fundamental 
confusion about the technology underlying general search. 
Still, vertical search sites complained since Google was a significant source of 
traffic for them. As Yelp, a vertical search site specializing in local searches, claimed in its 
Prospectus, “Our success depends in part on our ability to attract users through unpaid 
The GAI Report on the Digital Economy 
 
 
 
364 
Internet search on search engines like Google, Yahoo! and Bing.”63 It goes on to state: 
Google in particular is the most significant source of traffic to our website accounting for more 
than half of the visits to our website from Internet searches during the nine months ended 
September 30, 2011. Our success depends on our ability to maintain a prominent presence in 
search results for queries regarding local businesses on Google. Google has removed links to 
our website from portions of its web search product, and has promoted its own competing 
products, including Google’s local products, in its search results. Given the large volume of 
traffic to our website and the importance of the placement and display of results of a user’s 
search, similar actions in the future could have a substantial negative effect on our business 
and results of operations.64  
Ultimately, the FTC rejected the complaints of vertical search sites and, in closing its 
investigation after 19 months, issued a closing statement in which it stated that universals 
were innovations in product design that Google intended to improve its search results 
and that any ill effects those changes had on other search sites reflected competition on 
the merits, not an unfair method of competition. 
But the European Commission reached a different conclusion. In 2017, it found 
that Google had abused its position of dominance in “general search” to gain an unfair 
advantage in shopping search. This conclusion reflects a fundamental misunderstanding 
of search products and general search technology. Part of the problem stems from the 
multiple meanings of the word “general” as it applies to search. One meaning is a 
characterization of a type of search engine. Google (like Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo) 
is a general search engine, meaning that it seeks to provide results for all classes of search. 
This meaning of “general” is similar to the word “department” when one says that 
Macy’s is a department store. Macy’s does not sell “departments.” It has multiple 
departments selling different types of goods. The word “department” distinguishes 
Macy’s (and stores like it) from stores that specialize in one type of good such as clothing 
stores or sporting goods stores. Similarly, the term “general search engine” distinguishes 
 
63 Yelp! Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement 15 (Nov. 17, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1345016/000119312511315562/d245328ds1.htm. 
64 Id.  
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Google, Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo from thematic or vertical search engines that 
specialize in one type of search.  
Every search has a specific intent. Someone who enters a query into Google for 
“running shoes” in hope of locating running shoes to purchase does a shopping search. 
Someone who enters a query into Bing for “restaurants near me” is doing local search. A 
query to DuckDuckGo for “1984 US merger guidelines” is not a shopping, travel, local, 
news, video, or image search. One might label this category as “miscellaneous” or 
“general information.” Another possibility, though, is to label this class of search as 
“general search.” If so, then general search is just one of many classes of search that 
general search engines seek to satisfy. General search engines are not the only places to 
engage in this type of search. Wikipedia, which is not a general search engine, is another 
site for finding general information. But it might be that Google’s share of general (or 
general information or miscellaneous) search is higher than its share of other categories 
of search. 
Even if that is so, however, “general search” is not a component of shopping or 
local search, and so it makes no sense to suggest that bias in Google’s general search 
toward its own shopping results is an abuse of its alleged dominance in general search. 
Just as Macy’s needs to offer men’s suits that compete successfully with those available 
at men’s clothing stores if it wishes to have a successful men’s suit business, Google needs 
to compete with other providers of shopping search, including most notably Amazon, if 
people are going to use Google for shopping searches. When Google returns its shopping 
results at the top of (or anywhere on) the SERP in response to such a query, it is giving 
the user Google’s search results for that query. Those results are a single service. They are 
not a combination of multiple services or components, one in which it is dominant and 
one in which it is not. 
By characterizing Google’s efforts to improve its results for shopping queries as 
monopoly leveraging, the EC’s Google shopping decision reveals the risks in bringing 
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unilateral conduct cases alleging monopoly leveraging. As the Transamerica court 
observed, it is easy to imagine situations in which a dominant company would have both 
the incentive and ability to take actions that have the sole purpose of excluding a 
competitor to the detriment of customers, but it is far harder to articulate practical 
standards that prohibit such behavior without chilling the incentive of successful firms 
to continue to innovate and improve their products. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the models that underpinned the Chicago critique of a range of competition 
policy doctrines related to vertical foreclosure was the model of a monopolist integrating 
into an adjacent, perfectly competitive stage. That model which, as noted above, is 
sometimes described as the “single monopoly profit theorem,” is sometimes taken to 
suggest that firms with market power at one stage of a production process or over one of 
a set of complementary goods cannot increase profits by integrating into the adjacent 
stage. While the result is of course correct given the underlying assumptions, those 
assumptions are quite strong and fail to apply in many real settings. In fact, firms often 
have an incentive to integrate (either directly or through merger) into adjacent stages that 
are not perfectly competitive; and, when they do, they often have an incentive to engage 
in self-preferencing. 
For at least the past fifty years, antitrust economists have been arguing that the 
economic relationship among firms engaged in complementary activities is 
fundamentally different from those that sell substitute products and therefore compete 
with each other. Competitors have a mutual incentive to restrict output. In contrast, 
producers of complements have a mutual incentive to expand output. One lever to do so 
is to foreclose or raise the costs of rivals, but that is just one lever and it is not necessarily 
the dominant one. A key issue for policy makers is to judge whether the incentives for 
self-preferencing invalidate this distinction or, alternatively, whether it provides a 
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modest qualification that justifies intervention in a few rare exceptions to the general rule. 
And, whether or not the exceptions are rare, one needs to identify the conditions that 
distinguish when intervention is appropriate from those when it is not.  
With respect to vertical mergers, I have argued that what may be a trend towards 
intervention based on short-run pricing incentives is not based on sound economics as it 
fails to recognize the complexity of the countervailing incentives. A more coherent and 
economically sound policy, I believe, is to focus vertical merger enforcement on instances 
of successive dominance. The theory of such an approach is potential competition. The 
FTC and DOJ have been far more reluctant than they once were to challenge mergers on 
potential competition grounds, and it may be that they will find resistance to such 
challenges in court. However, one of the barriers to successful potential competition cases 
is that it is often difficult to explain why a particular company presents a unique threat. 
In cases of successive dominance, such claims can be compelling because a firm with 
market power at one stage has the most to gain from increased competition at an adjacent 
stage. 
With respect to monopolization (or other forms of unilateral conduct) cases, 
allegations of vertical foreclosure particularly in markets characterized by significant 
technological advances often implicate innovation in product design. Since changes in 
product design that have no purpose other than to exclude competitors are theoretically 
possible, some might argue that companies with significant market power should have 
to demonstrate consumer benefit from their innovations. Such a policy might seem 
consistent with consumer welfare maximization as the objective underlying competition 
policy enforcement. But such a position requires that competition agencies and courts are 
well-suited to judging the consumer welfare implications of innovations, and it makes no 
allowance for the possibility that attempts to innovate to improve products sometimes 
fail. Ford was not trying to fail with Edsel and the Coca-Cola Company was not trying to 
fail with New Coke. Even the most successful companies make mistakes in product 
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designs. Subjecting companies to antitrust liability for such cases would necessarily dull 
the incentive to innovate in product design and deny consumers the benefits from such 
innovations. 
